Welcome back to CMJ,
A lot happened in 2025 around critical minerals (and we followed it closely).New alliances formed. Government programs expanded. Strategic language intensified.
But if you zoom-out, the most important feature of the year was not coordination, it was reactiveness.
Again and again, alliances formed in response to events, not ahead of them. Cause first. Effect/Response second.
To make sense of this, I organized a chronological list of alliances, grouped by country (the effects). Before getting there, however, it is worth highlighting the causes: the trigger events that set this diplomatic machinery in motion.
Please note the dates, I’m sure you will see the pattern quickly.
China’s export controls: from signals to political leverage
Over the past two years, China has transformed export controls from a defensive regulatory tool into a coherent geopolitical instrument.What began as narrow licensing measures has evolved into a layered system spanning materials, processing technologies, downstream components, and most recently even foreign-made products.
Key milestones in the escalation:
Aug 2023: China introduces export licensing for germanium and gallium, requiring permits and end-use verification. Officially framed as compliance, the move signals China’s willingness to selectively manage dual-use material flows
Dec 2023: A ban on the export of rare earth processing technologies (extraction and separation) comes into force, effectively freezing the transfer of know-how and equipment critical to building ‘non-Chinese’ refining capacity
Sept 15, 2024: Export controls on antimony take effect, covering ores, metals, oxides, and processing technologies. The scope expands decisively toward defense-relevant materials
Dec 3, 2024: China imposes an outright ban on exports of germanium, gallium, and antimony to the United States for dual-use and defense applications, marking a shift from general controls to alliance-based discrimination
Apr 4, 2025: Under MOFCOM Announcement No. 18, China places seven rare earths (Sm, Gd, Tb, Dy, Lu, Sc, and Y) under a formal export licensing regime, directly targeting magnet, aerospace, and advanced electronics supply chains
Oct 9, 2025: MOFCOM Announcement No. 61 expands controls to twelve rare earth elements (adding Ho, Er, Tm, Eu, and Yb to the list), adds magnet components, and introduces extraterritorial restrictions on foreign products incorporating Chinese rare earths, mirroring secondary-sanctions logic
Why it matters:
The trajectory is clear: licensing > technology denial > basic materials bans > components bans > alliance-based controls > extraterritorial enforcement.
China is no longer relying on market dominance alone; it is institutionalizing leverage across the entire value chain.For consuming nations (a.k.a. the rest of the globe), diversification is now a strategic imperative, processing capacity a geopolitical asset, and time a diminishing luxury.
Reactionary movement of geopolitical alliances (please be aware of the dates, it’s remarkable):
United States (U.S.)
Feb 25, 2025: U.S.<>Ukraine The U.S. and Ukraine agreed on the terms of a framework linking critical mineral/resource development to Ukraine’s recovery financing architecture.
Apr 30, 2025: U.S.<>UkraineExecution of the Reconstruction Investment Fund agreement
Oct 20, 2025: U.S.<>AustraliaA bilateral supply security framework targeting mining, separation, processing, and investment coordination, explicitly framed around supply security and resilience.
Oct 26, 2025: U.S.<>MalaysiaAn MoU oriented around diversifying critical minerals supply chains and catalyzing cross-border investment pathways.
Oct 26, 2025: U.S.<>ThailandA MoU spanning upstream and midstream cooperation (including exploration, refining, recycling, and supply-chain governance).
Oct 28, 2025: U.S.<>JapanA full-chain framework to accelerate a secure supply of critical minerals and rare earths, including finance tools and stockpiling logic.
Nov 6, 2025: U.S.<>KazakhstanA bilateral MoU focused on building anchor projects and enabling financing pathways (including potential U.S. EXIM involvement reported publicly).
European Union (EU)
Mar 25, 2025: EU (intra-bloc) The Commission adopted a list of 47 Strategic Projects across 13 member states spanning extraction, processing, and recycling.
Apr 4, 2025: EU<>Central AsiaStrategic partnership launched at the first EU–Central Asia Summit for critical raw materials cooperation as a strategic pillar under a broader partnership umbrella.
Apr 4, 2025: EU<>KazakhstanThe EU and Kazakhstan endorsed a 2025–2026 roadmap to operationalize their raw materials/battery cooperation.
Jun 4, 2025: EU<>‘third party countries’ The EU selected 13 Strategic Projects in partner countries to reinforce external supply diversification under the CRMA (Critical Raw Materials Act) logic.
Nov 17, 2025: EIB<>Australia The European Investment Bank (EIB) moved to enable financing support for critical mineral projects also in Australia.
G7 and aligned multilateral arrangements
Jun 17, 2025: G7<>aligned partners The G7 launched CMAP to coordinate diversification, anticipate disruptions, and deepen cooperation across the value chain.
Oct 2025: G7 (led by Canada)<>aligned partnersCanada drove the formation of a Critical Minerals Production Alliance (CMPA) designed to accelerate supply (projects, capital mobilization, offtakes, and stockpiling concepts).
Oct 31–Nov 1, 2025: Australia<>CanadaCanada and Australia signed a Joint Declaration of Interest (JDI) to deepen cooperation and trade across the critical minerals value chain.
China
Jun 11, 2025: China<>AfricaChina and African counterparts met to advance implementation of FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) summit outcomes (trade/investment/infrastructure cooperation with downstream supply-chain implications). FOCAC remains a platform through which China sustains strategic economic access across resource-heavy partner states.
Aug 26, 2025: China<>IndonesiaIndonesia’s SWF (Sovereign Wealth Fund) Danantara partnered with China’s GEM (Green Eco-Manufacture) to develop a ‘green’ nickel processing hub.
Australia
Aug 18, 2025: Australia<>Japan (41st Japan–Australia Resources and Energy Dialogue)A ministerial dialogue explicitly covering investment environment and cooperation opportunities in critical minerals (alongside energy and net-zero policy).
Oct 20, 2025: Australia<>U.S.A formal framework targeting mining and processing cooperation and coordinated investment posture.
Nov 1, 2025: Australia<>CanadaProducer-to-producer cooperation structured around diversified, resilient supply chains and value-chain linking (including Critical Minerals).
Nov 17–18, 2025: Australia<>EIB The EIB opened the door to financing Australian critical minerals projects.
Dec 2025: Australia<>IndiaPublic remarks framed critical minerals as a priority lane for deeper bilateral economic ties and cooperation.
Japan
Aug 18, 2025: Japan<>Australia Japan and Australia discussed the investment environment and cooperation opportunities for critical minerals.
Aug 22, 2025: Japan<>NamibiaJapan and Namibia agreed to work closely to promote further Japanese investment, explicitly including mineral and energy resources.
Oct 28, 2025: Japan<>U.S.A formal end-to-end framework across policy tools, finance mechanisms, and stockpiling logic for securing supply through mining and processing.
As of now, China’s critical minerals export control regime is not unwinding. It is paused, deliberately and selectively.
Two of the most escalatory moves taken over the past year are currently suspended:
The December 2024 U.S.-specific ban on approvals for dual-use exports related to gallium, germanium, and antimony is paused until November 27, 2026.
The October 2025 rare earth control package (including expanded coverage, downstream components, and extraterritorial provisions targeting foreign-made products incorporating Chinese rare earths) is suspended until November 10, 2026.
Just to be clear, these are suspensions, not reversals.The measures remain legally intact, preserved in a ready state rather than dismantled.
What remains fully active is the underlying control architecture:
Export licensing regimes for gallium and germanium (since August 2023)
Broad controls on antimony (since September 2024)
Licensing requirements for selected rare earth elements (since April 2025)
Enhanced end-use and end-user scrutiny across defense, aerospace, magnets, and advanced electronics
The result is a system designed for optionality, not restraint.By freezing the most politically explosive elements while keeping the regulatory scaffolding fully operational, China has maximized leverage at minimal immediate cost.
Unless extended, both suspensions expire automatically in November 2026, at which point the controls resume by default.The signal to markets and governments is unambiguous: escalation is no longer a question of capacity or credibility, it is a matter of timing.And for the industries that rely on such materials and components, it’s a matter of finding an alternative by November, or obey the imposed regulations.
No wonder why the concerns about what will happen by mid-2026.Without a doubt, something has to happen. Otherwise, there is likely to be a significant impact on global value chains.
If 2025 was the year of reaction, will 2026 be the year of exposure?
The architecture is now visible. The tools are built. The deadlines are known.What remains uncertain is whether governments, industries, and capital markets will act before constraints reassert themselves, or only after.
As we move into 2026, several questions stop being theoretical and start becoming operational (and we should all be asking them constantly):
Strategic intent vs. Strategic delay
Are alliances meant to build capacity, or merely to signal alignment/strength?
How many of the announced frameworks will translate into financed, permitted, operating projects before November?
Are stockpiling, offtake guarantees, and price-risk mechanisms being deployed at scale, or still discussed as future options?
Industrial reality checks
Which supply chains have credible non-Chinese pathways today? And which are still aspirational?
How much midstream and downstream capacity can realistically be brought online within the next 12–18 months?
Which industries are quietly assuming regulatory compliance rather than diversification?
Capital allocation under geopolitical constraint
Is capital flowing toward speed and execution, or still trapped in feasibility loops?
Will public finance institutions move from de-risking language to risk-taking mandates? And therefore, help expedite the non-Chinese value chains?
Who absorbs the cost of redundancy: governments, consumers, or shareholders? Or all?
China’s optionality (and everyone else’s rigidity)
If suspensions expire in November 2026, who is actually ready?
What happens if controls resume selectively, not universally?
And perhaps most importantly: who has modeled the second-order effects of extraterritorial enforcement on global manufacturing? Does it mean a global inflation/recession? And are we ready for it?
The uncomfortable final question
If nothing materially changes in 2026, was diversification ever the goal or merely the narrative?
In the end, the countdown is set, and 2026 will not reward reaction but will rather expose it.
Our mission as CMJ is to help you answer those questions and make better/smarter decisions. Let’s stop being reactionary and start being more strategic.
Before closing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you all for the feedback, comments, and contributions received in 2025. This was a great and memorable year.
Off we go on another trip around the sun. I wish everyone a wonderful new year!
Thank you for reading and for being part of the CMJ community.In markets driven by geopolitics, foresight is power. If you found it valuable, share it with a peer who needs the same edge (or keep it close and use it to your advantage).
