[CW6] The Washington Minerals Summit (and its derivatives), Oak Ridge’s Renaissance, and the Uranium Policy Wave

Welcome back to CMJ,

Here are the 20-second highlights of what we’ll cover:

This week, the US moved from policy signaling to capital deployment, but the shape of that deployment is still being ‘negotiated’.

On February 4, ministers and officials from more than 50 nations convened in Washington to explore the framework for a critical minerals alliance. The meeting followed years of discussion about how allied nations might coordinate on supply chain security, and it surfaced a significant policy divergence.

The US has stepped back from its earlier proposal for price floor mechanisms. A pilot program with MP Materials had tested the concept, but the broader framework has not materialized. The stated concern is market distortion, while the practical concern is cost. Guaranteed minimum prices require budget commitments, and those commitments compete with other priorities.

Australia responded by signaling it would proceed with its Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve (CMSR) regardless of multilateral progress, almost as if concluding that waiting for consensus is itself a risk. The CMSR will function as a national buffer, with or without allied coordination.

This divergence matters. If the major producing nations move at different speeds with different mechanisms, the result is fragmentation rather than coordination. Stockpiles in one jurisdiction don’t necessarily benefit manufacturers in another. Pricing signals diverge. Investment decisions become harder to calibrate.

The more consequential capital deployment this week came from Brazil.

Serra Verde, the country’s only operating rare earth producer, finalized a $565 million loan expansion with the US International Development Finance Corporation. What makes it notable is the option for minority US government equity participation. This structure moves Washington from financier to potential shareholder.

The shift is meaningful. Grants create dependence. Loans create obligations. Equity creates alignment. When a government holds ownership in a supply chain asset, the incentives change. Project success becomes a government interest, not just a policy goal.

Serra Verde is also reportedly renegotiating its Chinese offtake contracts, with a potential shift to Western buyers by year-end. If executed, this could affect non-Chinese rare earth availability and strengthen permanent magnet supply chains outside China’s processing network.

China’s temporary suspension of gallium and rare earth export restrictions to the US remains in place through late 2026. Exports are possible, but licenses are still required. The control architecture is intact. The pause is tactical, not structural.

Uranium policy moved on multiple fronts this week, and the common thread was speed.

In Sweden, the government proposed legislation to accelerate nuclear project approvals and open coastal locations that were previously off-limits. The bill includes SEK 20 million in annual municipal grants through 2030 and targets 10 large reactors by 2045. For a country that historically maintained ambivalence about nuclear expansion, this represents a notable policy shift.

Poland signed its first operational financing agreement with US EXIM for the Westinghouse AP1000 project, part of a $17.8 billion letter of intent. The first reactor is targeted for 2033 commercial operation. The financing has moved from framework to execution.

India’s Draft National Electricity Policy 2026 set a target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 and opened the sector to private participation through the SHANTI Act. Nuclear projects will now be eligible for Green Bonds. The policy targets 4,000 kWh per capita consumption by 2047, up from roughly 1,300 today, and positions nuclear as a cornerstone of that trajectory.

South Korea confirmed two new large reactors totaling 2.8 GW by 2038, plus a 700 MW small modular reactor. The nuclear share of electricity is set to rise from 30.7% to 35.2%.

And in the US, Oak Ridge is emerging as the domestic enrichment anchor.

Centrus announced a $560 million expansion. BWXT opened a new centrifuge manufacturing facility with 430 jobs. LIS Technologies is investing $1.38 billion in laser enrichment. The Department of Energy (DOE) restarted uranium recovery at Savannah River’s H Canyon, with capacity to produce up to 19 metric tons of HALEU for advanced reactors. At Hanford, DOE leased the FMEF facility to General Matter for fuel cycle development.

Spot uranium held around $85.25 per pound, down from the $101.5 high after Uzbekistan boosted production. Analysts note the pullback, though underlying supply-demand dynamics cited by industry observers have not changed. Cigar Lake and MacArthur River face projected decline curves by the mid-2030s. Enrichment and conversion remain the binding constraints, not geology.

Copper fell to $5.77 per pound, its lowest level in six weeks and the worst weekly performance since late November.

The proximate cause is demand softening in China ahead of the Lunar New Year, with fabricator activity slowing and LME Asia inventory climbing. Traders are reportedly diverting African shipments to Chinese ports, adding to visible stocks.

The China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association projects 5% refined copper output growth in 2026, half the pace of 2025. The combination of slowing production growth and near-term demand weakness creates short-term price pressure.

The International Copper Study Group projects a 150,000 metric ton refined copper deficit by year-end 2026. Refined use is expected to grow 2.1% against 0.9% production growth. Grasberg and Kamoa-Kakula disruptions persist. New project pipelines remain years away from first production.

Exploration activity continues to surface optionality. Giant Mining gained 70% on a Nevada drill announcement. Solstice Minerals rose 148% on Western Australia results showing 62 meters at 1.55% copper from 256 meters, with the system described as open at depth.

The near-term price weakness and the medium-term supply gap coexist. They’re not contradictory; they operate on different timescales.

Lithium carbonate pulled back to CNY 134,500 per tonne, retreating from the CNY 180,000 high reached on January 26. The move reflects speculative position unwinding after a sharp run-up, not a change in fundamentals, according to market analysts.

Prices remain 74% higher than a year ago. The rebalancing thesis that drove the second-half 2025 rally remains a topic of discussion among market observers.

China’s policy mix continues to support demand. The government doubled its EV charging capacity target to 180 GW by 2027, a move that could benefit lithium-intensive energy storage systems. Domestic supply is also tightening: 27 mining permits were canceled in the Jiangxi lithium hub, and CATL’s Jianxiawo mine was suspended as part of the government’s campaign against overcapacity.

Battery energy storage systems now account for 25% of global battery demand, according to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, growing 44% in 2025. LFP chemistry dominates stationary storage. Sub-$100 per kWh system costs are becoming standard. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the third-largest market.

This diversification matters. Lithium demand is no longer a single-variable bet on EV adoption. Energy storage is becoming a structural pillar, with different price sensitivities and policy drivers than passenger vehicles.

The April reduction in China’s battery export rebates is also shaping near-term flows, with manufacturers reportedly front-running lithium orders before the policy takes effect.

Truth being told, the pattern this week was unmistakable: governments are spending.

The Washington ministerial. The Serra Verde equity option. Oak Ridge enrichment investments. Sweden’s municipal nuclear grants. Poland’s EXIM financing.These are actual examples of capital being deployed (not only policy papers or framework agreements).

The shift matters because it changes the credibility of Western diversification efforts. For years, the gap between strategic intent and bankable execution has been a recurring theme. Projects announced but not financed. Alliances formed but not funded. Capacity targets set but not built.

This week moved the needle, at least in uranium and rare earths.

The Trump administration’s high-level meetings with Ivanhoe’s Robert Friedland and GM’s CEO underscored the political priority. Critical minerals are now a White House agenda item, not just a Commerce Department program.

But the Washington ministerial also exposed the limits of coordination. Fifty nations in a room does not mean fifty nations with aligned interests. Producing countries want price support. Consuming countries want supply security. Financing countries want returns. Reconciling those interests takes more than a communiqué.

Australia’s decision to proceed with its Strategic Reserve independently is instructive. It has concluded that national action is faster than multilateral consensus. Whether that accelerates the broader effort or fragments it remains to be seen.

China’s temporary suspension of export restrictions to the US through late 2026 remains the backdrop. Exports are possible, but licenses are still required. The control architecture is intact (and the pause is tactical/strategical).

The November 2026 expiration date looms over every supply chain planning exercise. If suspensions lapse without extension, the escalatory measures resume by default.

For industries that depend on these materials, the question is whether the parallel infrastructure being built now will be ready in time, or whether they will be navigating China’s regulatory architecture.

Thank you for reading and for being part of the CMJ community.

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